Candidate Nomination Procedures and Political Selection: Evidence from Latin American Parties

46 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2010

See all articles by Fernando M. Aragon

Fernando M. Aragon

London School of Economics - STICERD

Date Written: January 2009

Abstract

This paper explores empirically the role of nomination procedures on political selection and the determinants for adopting contestable selection methods such as primaries. Using data from Latin American parties, I find evidence that political competition increases probability of primary adoption. Moreover, primary nominated candidates obtained larger vote shares and during their mandate countries experienced improvements in several measures of quality of government. The results exploit within party variation and are robust to relevant identification concerns. Together, these findings suggest that nomination procedures matter for political selection and that the quality differences are significant enough to influence electoral and economic outcomes.

JEL Classification: D72, D73, H39, O12

Suggested Citation

Aragon, Fernando M., Candidate Nomination Procedures and Political Selection: Evidence from Latin American Parties (January 2009). LSE STICERD Research Paper No. EOPP003, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1546897

Fernando M. Aragon (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - STICERD ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+442078523536 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://http:\\personal.lse.ac.uk\aragon

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