Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, But Second Served?

49 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2010

See all articles by Johan Eyckmans

Johan Eyckmans

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies

Michael Finus

University of Stirling

Bianca Rundshagen

University of Hagen

Date Written: February 4, 2010

Abstract

We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by other proposals. Second, we analyze whether a moderator, like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordinating actions by making recommendations that must be Pareto-improving to all parties. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing our algorithm.

Keywords: International Climate Agreements, Sequential Coalition Formation, Coordination through Moderator, Integrated Assessment Model, Alogorithm for Computations

JEL Classification: C79, H87, Q54

Suggested Citation

Eyckmans, Johan and Finus, Michael and Rundshagen, Bianca, Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, But Second Served? (February 4, 2010). FEEM Working Paper No. 109.2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1547905 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1547905

Johan Eyckmans

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Michael Finus (Contact Author)

University of Stirling ( email )

Stirling, Scotland FK9 4LA
United Kingdom

Bianca Rundshagen

University of Hagen ( email )

Profilstr. 8
Hagen, D-58084
Germany

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