Fiscal Decentralisation and the Quality of Public Services in Russian Regions

EBRD Working Paper 111

53 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2010 Last revised: 28 Feb 2014

See all articles by Lev Freinkman

Lev Freinkman

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow); World Bank - The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)

Alexander Plekhanov

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)

Date Written: November 1, 2009

Abstract

The paper provides empirical analysis of the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and the quality of public services in the Russian regions. The analysis suggests that fiscal decentralisation has no significant effect on the key inputs into secondary education, such as schools, computers, or availability of pre-schooling, but has a significant positive effect on average examination results, controlling for key observable inputs and regional government spending on education. Decentralisation also has a positive impact on the quality of municipal utilities provision. Both effects can be attributed to strengthened fiscal incentives rather than to superior productive efficiency of municipal governments.

Keywords: decentralization, education, utilities, public services, Russian regions

JEL Classification: H72, H73, H75, H77

Suggested Citation

Freinkman, Lev and Plekhanov, Alexander, Fiscal Decentralisation and the Quality of Public Services in Russian Regions (November 1, 2009). EBRD Working Paper 111, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1548324 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1548324

Lev Freinkman

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow) ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

World Bank - The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) ( email )

Washington, DC 20433
United States

Alexander Plekhanov (Contact Author)

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) ( email )

One Exchange Square
London, EC2A 2EH
United Kingdom

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