Intelligence and Decision Making Before the War with Iraq
THE POLARIZED PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH, pp. 213-242, George C. Edwards and Desmond King, eds., Oxford University Press, 2007
Posted: 6 Feb 2010 Last revised: 15 Feb 2010
Date Written: May 25, 2006
Abstract
This paper argues that as the administration moved toward war in Iraq, decision making was neither deliberate nor deliberative but consisted of a series of decisions that cumulatively led to war. Second, I analyze the arguments of the administration that Iraq was closely linked to al Qaeda and that it possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that were a threat to the United States. The intelligence produced by the intelligence community was sketchy and ambiguous; however, political officials in the administration presented it with unwarranted certainty to bolster their case for war. Third, I argue that the administration sought to shape the conclusions of intelligence agencies and downplayed or ignored contrary evidence and the reservations of intelligence professionals. As a result of flawed decision making, the administration went to war in Iraq under misperceptions that resulted in the undermining of U.S. credibility throughout the world.
Keywords: Presidency, Iraq War, Intelligence, Decision Making
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