Intelligence and Decision Making Before the War with Iraq

THE POLARIZED PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH, pp. 213-242, George C. Edwards and Desmond King, eds., Oxford University Press, 2007

Posted: 6 Feb 2010 Last revised: 15 Feb 2010

See all articles by James P. Pfiffner

James P. Pfiffner

Schar School of Policy and Government

Date Written: May 25, 2006

Abstract

This paper argues that as the administration moved toward war in Iraq, decision making was neither deliberate nor deliberative but consisted of a series of decisions that cumulatively led to war. Second, I analyze the arguments of the administration that Iraq was closely linked to al Qaeda and that it possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that were a threat to the United States. The intelligence produced by the intelligence community was sketchy and ambiguous; however, political officials in the administration presented it with unwarranted certainty to bolster their case for war. Third, I argue that the administration sought to shape the conclusions of intelligence agencies and downplayed or ignored contrary evidence and the reservations of intelligence professionals. As a result of flawed decision making, the administration went to war in Iraq under misperceptions that resulted in the undermining of U.S. credibility throughout the world.

Keywords: Presidency, Iraq War, Intelligence, Decision Making

Suggested Citation

Pfiffner, James P., Intelligence and Decision Making Before the War with Iraq (May 25, 2006). THE POLARIZED PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH, pp. 213-242, George C. Edwards and Desmond King, eds., Oxford University Press, 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1548910

James P. Pfiffner (Contact Author)

Schar School of Policy and Government ( email )

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