Cooperation and Competition in Intergenerational Experiments in the Field and the Laboratory

GATE Working Paper No. 09-31

45 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2010 Last revised: 14 Jun 2010

See all articles by Gary Charness

Gary Charness

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics

Marie Claire Villeval

GATE, CNRS

Date Written: December 1, 2009

Abstract

There is economic pressure towards the postponement of the retirement age, but employers are still reluctant to employ older workers. We investigate the comparative behavior of juniors and seniors in experiments conducted both onsite with the employees of two large firms and in a conventional laboratory environment with students and retirees. We show that seniors are no more risk averse than juniors and are typically more cooperative ; both juniors and working seniors respond strongly to competition. The implication is that it may be beneficial to define additional incentives near the end of the career to motivate and retain older workers.

Keywords: Age, performance, diversity, stereotypes, cooperation, competition, inter-generational games, experiments

JEL Classification: A13, B49, C91, C93, J14, J18, J38, J7

Suggested Citation

Charness, Gary and Villeval, Marie Claire, Cooperation and Competition in Intergenerational Experiments in the Field and the Laboratory (December 1, 2009). GATE Working Paper No. 09-31, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1553733 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1553733

Gary Charness (Contact Author)

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics ( email )

2127 North Hall
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States
805-893-2412 (Phone)
805-893-8830 (Fax)

Marie Claire Villeval

GATE, CNRS ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France
+33 472 86 60 79 (Phone)
+33 472 86 60 90 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/marie-claire-villeval

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
92
Abstract Views
1,628
Rank
510,028
PlumX Metrics