Download This PaperFolk Theorems with Bounded Recall Under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version
43 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2010 Last revised: 5 Mar 2010
There are 2 versions of this paper
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version
Date Written: March 2, 2010
Abstract
We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust under almost-perfect almost-public monitoring. That is, the same specification of behavior continues to be an equilibrium when the monitoring is perturbed from perfect to highly-correlated private.
Keywords: Repeated games, bounded recall strategies, folk theorem, imperfect monitoring
JEL Classification: C72, C73
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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