Congressional Constraints and Tactical Supreme Court Maneuvers: Calling for the Views of the United States Solicitor General

44 Pages Posted: 11 Mar 2010

See all articles by Ryan C. Black

Ryan C. Black

Michigan State University - Department of Political Science

Ryan J. Owens

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Political Science

Date Written: January 17, 2010

Abstract

Do United States Supreme Court justices invoke the aid of executive branch officials to help them overcome congressional constraints? We examine archival data collected from the private papers of former Justice Harry A. Blackmun to analyze the conditions under which Supreme Court justices force the Solicitor General to participate in cases. We find that in addition to legal considerations, justices invite the SG to participate in cases so as to gain information that will aid them in determining whether the president will use his veto to protect the Court's decision against congressional override attempts. Justices are between 44% and 56% more likely to invite the SG when they require the president's veto to protect their decisions. These results hold across a host of alternative models of legislative decision making and other various modeling specifications.

Suggested Citation

Black, Ryan C. and Owens, Ryan J., Congressional Constraints and Tactical Supreme Court Maneuvers: Calling for the Views of the United States Solicitor General (January 17, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1568387 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1568387

Ryan C. Black

Michigan State University - Department of Political Science ( email )

East Lansing, MI 48824
United States

HOME PAGE: http://ryancblack.org

Ryan J. Owens (Contact Author)

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Political Science ( email )

406 North Hall
1050 Bascom Mall
Madison, WI 53706
United States
608-263-2279 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://law.wisc.edu/profiles/rjowens@wisc.edu

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