Seasoned Equity Offerings and Customer-Supplier Relationships

Journal of Financial Intermediation (2018), 33:1, 98-114, 5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper (2010)

46 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2010 Last revised: 11 Jun 2020

See all articles by William C. Johnson

William C. Johnson

University of Massachusetts Lowell - The Robert J. Manning School of Business

Jun-Koo Kang

Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University

Ronald W. Masulis

University of New South Wales, Sydney; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Financial Research Network (FIRN); National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER)

Sangho Yi

Sogang University; affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: September 7, 2017

Abstract

We analyze equity financing decisions by firms with major customer relationships to assess whether major trading relationships create interdependence in policies and market values. We find supplier issuance decisions have significant negative effects for large customers, which become more pronounced when information asymmetry or economic dependence of suppliers and customers rise or when suppliers make larger relationship-specific investments or offer valuable product guarantees. Incentives to maintain major trading relationships appear to weaken after supplier equity offerings, leading to shorter trading relationships and declines in relationship-specific investments. We document clear evidence that major trading partners’ financial and investment policies are interdependent.

Keywords: Information revelation, product market relationship, seasoned equity offerings

JEL Classification: G30

Suggested Citation

Johnson, William C. and Kang, Jun-Koo and Masulis, Ronald W. and Yi, Sangho and Yi, Sangho, Seasoned Equity Offerings and Customer-Supplier Relationships (September 7, 2017). Journal of Financial Intermediation (2018), 33:1, 98-114, 5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper (2010), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1571371 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1571371

William C. Johnson (Contact Author)

University of Massachusetts Lowell - The Robert J. Manning School of Business ( email )

One University Avenue
Lowell, MA 01854
United States

Jun-Koo Kang

Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University ( email )

Nanyang Avenue, Block S3-01b-54
Singapore, 639798
Singapore
(+65) 6790-5662 (Phone)
(+65) 6791-3697 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.nbs.ntu.edu.sg/nbs_corporate/divisions/bnf/index.asp

Ronald W. Masulis

University of New South Wales, Sydney ( email )

UNSW Business School
High St
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia
612-9385-5860 (Phone)
612-9385-6347 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Financial Research Network (FIRN)

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) ( email )

BIZ 2 Storey 4, 04-05
1 Business Link
Singapore, 117592
Singapore

Sangho Yi

Sogang University ( email )

Seoul 121-742
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)
82-2-705-8864 (Phone)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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