Dynamic Auctions: A Survey
16 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2010
There are 2 versions of this paper
Dynamic Auctions: A Survey
Date Written: March 19, 2010
Abstract
We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents or buyers whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents or buyers whose private information changes across time. Within each of these settings, we discuss both efficient (welfare-maximizing) and optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanisms.
Keywords: Dynamic Auctions and Mechanisms, Random Arrivals and Departures, Changing Private Information, Incentive Compatibility
JEL Classification: C73, D43, D44, D82, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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