Kant and the Problem with Pardons

29 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2010 Last revised: 2 Apr 2010

See all articles by John M. Parrish

John M. Parrish

Loyola Marymount University

Alex S. Tuckness

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: March 31, 2010

Abstract

Modernity's two most influential systems of moral philosophy, utilitarianism and deontology, agree on almost nothing at the level of core principles. But their respective founders, Bentham and Kant, did concur on one rather surprising policy preference- their hostility to the exercise of public mercy. In this paper, we explore the roots of that hostility in the writings of Kant. We situate Kant's views on punishment within political debates going on in 18th century Prussia and argue that Kant's opposition to pardons rests not primarily on a general sense that every evil deed must receive proportionate human punishment, but rather on the conditions for the legitimate exercise of political power. Kant's primary objection is to the sovereign forgiving wrongs done to other citizens, which explains the anomaly of why Kant allows commutations in cases where mass executions would deplete the population of the state.

Keywords: Kant Punishment Mercy Pardons Political

Suggested Citation

Parrish, John M. and Tuckness, Alex S., Kant and the Problem with Pardons (March 31, 2010). Western Political Science Association 2010 Annual Meeting Paper , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1580465

John M. Parrish (Contact Author)

Loyola Marymount University ( email )

Alex S. Tuckness

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

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