Baylor University Roundtable on the Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors

26 Pages Posted: 1 Mar 2023

See all articles by Michael C. Jensen

Michael C. Jensen

Harvard Business School; SSRN; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Harvard University - Accounting & Control Unit

Ronald J. Naples

Quaker Chemical Corporation

Trevor S. Harris

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Don Chew

Journal of Applied Corporate Finance

John Martin

Baylor University

Abstract

A small group of academics and practitioners discusses four major controversies in the theory and practice of corporate finance:

• What is the social purpose of the public corporation? Should corporate managements aim to maximize the profitability and value of their companies, or should they instead try to balance the interests of their shareholders against those of “stakeholder” groups, such as employees, customers, and local communities?

• Should corporate executives consider ending the common practice of earnings guidance? Are there other ways of shifting the focus of the public dialogue between management and investors away from near-term earnings and toward longer-run corporate strategies, policies, and goals? And can companies influence the kinds of investors who buy their shares?

• Are U.S. CEOs overpaid? What role have equity ownership and financial incentives played in the past performance of U.S. companies? And are there ways of improving the design of U.S. executive pay?

• Can the principles of corporate governance and financial management at the core of the private equity model - notably, equity incentives, high leverage, and active participation by large investors - be used to increase the values of U.S. public companies?

Suggested Citation

Jensen, Michael C. and Naples, Ronald J. and Harris, Trevor S. and Chew, Donald and Martin, John, Baylor University Roundtable on the Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 22, Issue 1, pp. 8-31, Winter 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1581812 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2010.00258.x

Michael C. Jensen (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School ( email )

Soldiers Field
Negotiations, Organizations & Markets
Boston, MA 02163
United States

HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&facId=6484

SSRN ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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Harvard University - Accounting & Control Unit ( email )

Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States

Ronald J. Naples

Quaker Chemical Corporation

One Quaker Park
901 E. Hector Street
Conshohocken, PA 19428-2380
United States

Trevor S. Harris

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
608 Uris Hall
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-851-1802 (Phone)
212-316-9219 (Fax)

Donald Chew

Journal of Applied Corporate Finance ( email )

United States

John Martin

Baylor University

School of Engineering & Computer Science
Waco, TX 76798
United States

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