The Resilience of Computationalism

20 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2010

See all articles by Gualtiero Piccinini

Gualtiero Piccinini

University of Missouri at Saint Louis

Date Written: April 26, 2010

Abstract

Computationalism – the view that cognition is computation – has always been controversial. It faces two types of objection. According to insufficiency objections, computation is insufficient for some cognitive phenomenon X. According to objections from neural realization, cognitive processes are realized by neural processes, but neural processes have feature Y and having Y is incompatible with being (or realizing) computations. In this paper, I explain why computationalism has survived these objections. Insufficiency objections are at best partial: for all they establish, computation may be sufficient for cognitive phenomena other than X, may be part of the explanation for X, or both. Objections from neural realization are based either on a false contrast between feature Y and computation or on an account of computation that is too vague to yield the desired conclusion. To adjudicate the dispute between computationalism and its foes, I will conclude that we need a better account of computation.

Keywords: computationalism

JEL Classification: Z00

Suggested Citation

Piccinini, Gualtiero, The Resilience of Computationalism (April 26, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1596311 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1596311

Gualtiero Piccinini (Contact Author)

University of Missouri at Saint Louis ( email )

1 University Blvd.
St Louis, MO 63121
United States

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