Borrowing in Buyouts

Posted: 8 May 2010

See all articles by Paolo Colla

Paolo Colla

Bocconi University - Department of Finance; Bocconi University - BAFFI Center on International Markets, Money, and Regulation

Filippo Ippolito

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Hannes F. Wagner

Bocconi University - Department of Finance; Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: September 30, 2009

Abstract

We develop and test a model of debt structure and pricing in leveraged buyouts (LBOs). The model accounts for both market and firm specific variables and illustrates how collateral, security and seniority, as well as target future cash-flows and market interest rates determine the cost of financing of the different layers of senior and subordinated debt. We test the model predictions on a global sample of 240 LBOs involving both private and public targets from 1997 to 2008. We show that collateral affects the pricing of senior and junior debt asymmetrically, in a manner that reflects the priority hierarchy of these claims. We also show that the relationship between amount of debt raised and pricing differs for firms with high and low collateral.

Keywords: Leverage buyout, capital structure, private equity

JEL Classification: G30, G34

Suggested Citation

Colla, Paolo and Ippolito, Filippo and Ippolito, Filippo and Wagner, Hannes F., Borrowing in Buyouts (September 30, 2009). CAREFIN Research Paper No. 14/09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1600230

Paolo Colla (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Finance ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milano, MI 20136
Italy

Bocconi University - BAFFI Center on International Markets, Money, and Regulation ( email )

Milano, 20136
Italy

Filippo Ippolito

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
(+34) 93 542 2578 (Phone)
(+34) 93 542 1746 (Fax)

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Hannes F. Wagner

Bocconi University - Department of Finance ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milano, MI 20136
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://mypage.unibocconi.eu/hanneswagner

Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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