Download This PaperDelays and Partial Agreements in Multi-Issue Bargaining
30 Pages Posted: 11 May 2010 Last revised: 15 Nov 2010
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Delays and Partial Agreements in Multi-Issue Bargaining
Date Written: May 5, 2010
Abstract
We model a situation in which two players bargain over two issues (pies), one of which can only be resolved at a future date. We find that if the players value the issues asymmetrically (one player considers the existing issue more important than the future one, while the other player has the opposite valuation) then they may delay agreement on the first issue until the second one is finally on the table. If we allow for partial agreements, then the players never leave an issue completely unresolved. They either make a partial agreement on the first, and wait for the second one to emerge before completing the agreement; or they come to complete agreements on each of the issues at their earliest possible dates.
Keywords: bargaining, multiple issues, delay, hold-up, inefficiency
JEL Classification: C78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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