Does Self-Interest Skew State Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions? A Preliminary Analysis Based on the First Verified Emissions Estimates Under the Kyoto Protocol

Climate Law, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 313-324, 2010

11 Pages Posted: 30 May 2010 Last revised: 29 Oct 2013

See all articles by Alexander Zahar

Alexander Zahar

Southwest University of Political Science and Law; China-ASEAN Legal Research Center; Macquarie University - Macquarie Law School (Sydney, Australia)

Date Written: May 15, 2010

Abstract

The paper considers the changes to the base-year GHG-emission inventories of Annex I parties to the Kyoto Protocol (herein referred to, simply, as Annex B parties) made in the course of the review of those inventories by expert review teams. I ask whether, in the reporting of these states, any general tendency is observable of states misreporting (at an advantage to themselves) their emissions prior to the review. I conclude that the information to date raises many questions but provides few concrete answers; nevertheless, the issue points to an important area of study within the larger field of environmental governance.

Keywords: Kyoto Protocol, Expert Review Teams, Greenhouse Gas Inventories, State Compliance, UNFCCC Annex I Parties

Suggested Citation

Zahar, Alexander, Does Self-Interest Skew State Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions? A Preliminary Analysis Based on the First Verified Emissions Estimates Under the Kyoto Protocol (May 15, 2010). Climate Law, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 313-324, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1608567

Alexander Zahar (Contact Author)

Southwest University of Political Science and Law ( email )

Chongqing
China

China-ASEAN Legal Research Center ( email )

Chongqing, Chongqing
China

Macquarie University - Macquarie Law School (Sydney, Australia) ( email )

North Ryde
Sydney, New South Wales 2109
Australia

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