Civil Society, Institutional Change and the Politics of Reform: The Great Transition

42 Pages Posted: 19 May 2010

See all articles by Laszlo Bruszt

Laszlo Bruszt

Central European University

Nauro F. Campos

University College London; University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - The William Davidson Institute; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Jan Fidrmuc

Brunel University - Department of Economics and Finance; L.E.M., Université de Lille; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Global Labor Organization (GLO); Institute for Strategy and Analysis, Government Office of the Slovak Republic

Gérard Roland

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: May 2010

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between differences in civil society development under communism and divergence in the nature and pace of political and economic reform and transformation after 1989. We put together a unique data set on dissident activities for the 27 former centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the years immediately preceding the collapse of communism: 1985 to 1989 for Central and Eastern Europe and 1985 to 1991 for the former Soviet Union. Our data measure the nature and intensity of political opposition to the communist regime, and the communist governments response to such opposition. We relate the data to subsequent political and economic developments in the post-communist countries. We find that political opposition was considerably more intense in the Central and Eastern European countries than in the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the frequency of government reaction, and the probability that the reaction was violent, was substantially higher in the former Soviet Union. This rich data allows tests of conflicting hypotheses on the politics of institutional change and economic reform. Both the extent of political opposition and the frequency and severity of government reaction help explain the choice of political regime after 1989/1991, the concentration of power in the executive branch of government. The vibrancy of civil societies and their level of organization before the collapse of communism is an important factor in explaining the nature and pace of market oriented reforms.

Keywords: civil society, economic reform, political protest

JEL Classification: O1, P2

Suggested Citation

Bruszt, Laszlo and Campos, Nauro F. and Fidrmuc, Jan and Fidrmuc, Jan and Roland, Gérard, Civil Society, Institutional Change and the Politics of Reform: The Great Transition (May 2010). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7825, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1611521

Laszlo Bruszt (Contact Author)

Central European University ( email )

Nador u 9
Budapest, 1022
Hungary

Nauro F. Campos

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - The William Davidson Institute

724 E. University Ave.
Wyly Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Jan Fidrmuc

Brunel University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Uxbridge UB8 3PH
United Kingdom
+44 1895 266 528 (Phone)
+44 1895 269 770 (Fax)

L.E.M., Université de Lille ( email )

France

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Global Labor Organization (GLO) ( email )

Collogne
Germany

Institute for Strategy and Analysis, Government Office of the Slovak Republic ( email )

Bratislava
Slovakia

Gérard Roland

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States
510-642-4321 (Phone)
510-642-6615 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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