Centralized Versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: a Political Economy Analysis

29 Pages Posted: 19 May 1999 Last revised: 11 Nov 2022

See all articles by Timothy J. Besley

Timothy J. Besley

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Stephen Coate

Cornell University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: April 1999

Abstract

This paper takes a fresh look at the trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods. The point of departure is to model a centralized system as one in which public spending is financed by general taxation, but districts can receive different levels of local public goods. In a world of benevolent governments, the disadvantages of centralization stressed in the existing literature disappear, suggesting that the case for decentralization must be driven by political economy considerations. Our political economy analysis assumes that under decentralization public goods are selected by locally elected representatives, while under a centralized system policy choices are determined by a legislature consisting of elected representatives from each district. We then study the role of taste heterogeneity, spillovers and legislative behavior in determining the case for centralization.

Suggested Citation

Besley, Timothy J. and Coate, Stephen, Centralized Versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: a Political Economy Analysis (April 1999). NBER Working Paper No. w7084, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=161291

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