Reforming Global Economic Governance: A Strategy for Middle Powers in the G20

Going Global: Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Korea and South Africa in International Affairs, Jakarta, Indonesia, May 25-26, 2010

8 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2010 Last revised: 27 Mar 2014

See all articles by Daniel Bradlow

Daniel Bradlow

University of Pretoria; American University - Washington College of Law

Date Written: June 5, 2010

Abstract

In this paper I argue that middle powers that are members of the G20 can extract substantial benefit from their participation in the G20 if they have both a clear long term vision of global economic governance and a plan of action that is based on obtainable short term objectives.

In the article I address four issues. The first is that the institutional arrangements for global economic governance will remain unstable until the current process of changes in the balance of global political and economic power plays itself out. The second is that, given the changing international power dynamics, the current “manager” of the global economy, the G20, is unlikely to be a stable entity. Consequently it can only be effective if it focuses on the relatively narrow range of economic issues of common interest to all G20 members. Third, middle-size countries need a long term vision of global financial governance to guide their conduct in the G20 and other forums of global governance. Fourth, the middle powers will only be able to capitalize on whatever short term opportunities may arise from their participation in the G20 if they identify a set of achievable short term objectives and devise a strategy for reaching them.

Keywords: International Financial Governance, International Financial Institutions

JEL Classification: F02, F33

Suggested Citation

Bradlow, Daniel David, Reforming Global Economic Governance: A Strategy for Middle Powers in the G20 (June 5, 2010). Going Global: Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Korea and South Africa in International Affairs, Jakarta, Indonesia, May 25-26, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1624909 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1624909

Daniel David Bradlow (Contact Author)

University of Pretoria ( email )

Physical Address Economic and Management Sciences
Pretoria, Gauteng 0002
South Africa

American University - Washington College of Law ( email )

International Legal Studies Program
4801 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.
Washington, DC 20016
United States
202-274-4205 (Phone)
202-274-4116 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.wcl.american.edu/faculty/bradlow/index.

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