Botnet Economics and Devising Defence Schemes from Attackers’ Own Reward Processes: A Case with Use of Game Theory

15 Pages Posted: 1 Jul 2010

See all articles by Louis-Francois Pau

Louis-Francois Pau

Copenhagen Business School (CBS); Rotterdam School of Management; L.M. Ericsson; GIBS

Date Written: April 30, 2010

Abstract

This paper focuses on botnet economics and design of defensive strategies. It takes the view that by combining scarce information on the attackers’ business models, with rational economic analysis of these business processes, one can identify some qualitative guidance on additional economic defense mechanisms which the target can implement, often in a cheaper way. After a short survey of game theory in the security area, is presented a real case of an Internet casino. This leads to develop a model, applicable to this case but of much more general nature, which is presented first qualitatively then quantitatively. This allows carrying out different analyses based on different equilibrium or termination principles; the ones studied are reward break-even analysis, and Max-Min analysis from game theory, for the target and the attackers. On that basis, a number of specific economic and information led defense strategies are identified which can be further studied using the model and specific adaptations to other data or cases.

Keywords: Botnets, Economics, Game theory, Internet casino, Cyber defense

JEL Classification: C7, D18, K42, L83, O3

Suggested Citation

Pau, Louis-Francois, Botnet Economics and Devising Defence Schemes from Attackers’ Own Reward Processes: A Case with Use of Game Theory (April 30, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1632830 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1632830

Louis-Francois Pau (Contact Author)

Copenhagen Business School (CBS) ( email )

Solbjerg Plads 3
Frederiksberg C, DK - 2000
Denmark

Rotterdam School of Management ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Room T08-21
3000 DR Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands

L.M. Ericsson ( email )

Kista
Sweden

GIBS ( email )

Lynnwood Road
Pretoria 5100, 0002
South Africa

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