The Law of Unintended Consequences in Soccer: Impact of Three-Point-A-Win Rule on Strategies and Outcomes

Kyiv School of Economics Discussion Papers

20 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2010

See all articles by Oleksandr Shepotylo

Oleksandr Shepotylo

Aston University - Aston Business School

Date Written: June 24, 2010

Abstract

This paper analyzes whether the three-point rule in soccer brought more action to the game for a large sample of European championships in 1990-1997, revealing team-specific heterogeneity of responses caused by differences in team tactics in the period prior to the rule change. Teams that relied more heavily on tie-intensive tactics dramatically changed their behavior towards more attacking style in away games, considerably reducing probability of a tie. Interestingly, even though the three-point rule significantly reduced proportion of ties, it did not bring more goals into the game because the increased rewards of scoring when the current score is tied were offset by increased incentives of defending the current score when one team led.

Keywords: Heterogeneous response, Soccer, Sports, Three-point system

JEL Classification: C40, L51, L83

Suggested Citation

Shepotylo, Oleksandr, The Law of Unintended Consequences in Soccer: Impact of Three-Point-A-Win Rule on Strategies and Outcomes (June 24, 2010). Kyiv School of Economics Discussion Papers, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1633386 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1633386

Oleksandr Shepotylo (Contact Author)

Aston University - Aston Business School ( email )

Aston Triangle
Birmingham, B47ET
United Kingdom

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