The Federalist and Executive Power

22 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2010 Last revised: 24 Nov 2010

See all articles by James P. Pfiffner

James P. Pfiffner

Schar School of Policy and Government

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

Occasionally, the United States is confronted with the dilemma that, in emergencies, presidents may find it necessary to take actions that ignore constitutional restraints and break the law. In such cases, a strict adherence to the law might constrain the president from acting quickly to protect national security. Some have argued that the president has the constitutional authority to take whatever actions are deemed to be necessary, regardless of the law, and that this authority is available indefinitely as long as it is exercised under the commander in chief authority conferred in Article II. After reviewing the arguments in The Federalist, this paper argues that in crises presidents may legitimately take extraordinary actions outside their constitutional authority, but their actions are legitimate only insofar as they are transparent and presidents seek congressional sanction as soon as the immediate emergency has passed.

Keywords: presidency, national security, separation of powers, Fedeeralist Papers, war power

Suggested Citation

Pfiffner, James P., The Federalist and Executive Power (2010). APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, GMU School of Public Policy Research Paper No. 2010-29, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1642622 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1642622

James P. Pfiffner (Contact Author)

Schar School of Policy and Government ( email )

Founders Hall
3351 Fairfax Dr.
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

HOME PAGE: http://pfiffner.gmu.edu

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
171
Abstract Views
1,168
Rank
315,815
PlumX Metrics