Compañero, Correligionario, Comprovinciano: Initial Notes on the Nationalization of Legislative Collaboration
28 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2010 Last revised: 31 Aug 2010
Date Written: 2010
Abstract
This paper analyzes the nationalization of collaborative policy efforts among lawmakers. In doing so, we distinguish the nationalization of electoral competition and the nationalization of legislator’s policy intent. To measure the nationalization of legislative efforts, we assess the degree to which legislators collaborate with members of their district delegations and compare it to the level of intra-party and inter-party collaboration with members from other districts. Though conceptually independent, electoral and legislative nationalization are theoretically related. Declining electoral nationalization may lead representatives to draft territorially targeted legislation and thus to cooperate more frequently with their peers elected in the same district. We interpret the density of co-sponsorhip networks as indicative of legislative cooperation. Exponential random graph models allow us to identify and compare the determinants of this density. A study of 50,825 legislative initiatives proposed to the Argentine Congress in the period 1984-2007 provides support for our hypothesis: provincial co-membership has become a stronger predictor of co-sponsorhip as electoral nationalization declined.
Keywords: party nationalization, legislative networks, cosponsorhip, Argentina
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation