The Policy Impact of Senior Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Abstract

We examine the influence of the continued presence of judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals after the decision has been made to leave active status for senior status. We find that senior judges, who have a growing presence on the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1977 to 2008, have tended to blunt the ideological impact of changing partisan control of the executive branch. Whereas the partisan and ideological composition of the active bench swings more dramatically in response to control of the White House, the full bench is less susceptible to such swings due to the on-going presence of senior judges. We also find preliminary evidence that senior judges behave differently on the bench than do their colleagues in active status, in that senior judges are less influenced by the policy preferences of those who appointed them. Our findings have implications for those interested in the composition and decision making of the federal courts, and as well for those interested in the legacy created by a president’s appointments to the bench.