Understanding Lockups: Effects in Bankruptcy and the Market for Corporate Control

Yale Journal on Regulation

Posted: 11 Jun 1999

See all articles by Kermit Roosevelt

Kermit Roosevelt

University of Pennsylvania Law School

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Abstract

The article investigates the effects of lockups, devices used to compensate unsuccessful bidders. Lockups are relevant in contexts in which sales have auction-like characteristics. Bankruptcy and the market for corporate control are two such situations, since the governing legal regimes prevent sales from being swiftly consummated and require sellers to take the most favorable offer that emerges during the waiting period.

Existing scholarship has considered lockups in both areas. The analysis of lockups in the market for corporate control is fairly well developed. This article shows that it is importantly incomplete because it fails both to distinguish between ex ante and ex post analysis of lockups and to apply the auction theory developed by economists. The bankruptcy scholarship lags behind the analysis of mergers and acquisitions and is even less satisfactory. After developing the correct picture of lockups in mergers and acquisitions, the article applies it to the bankruptcy context, showing how differences in the appropriate goals require different standards for courts reviewing lockups.

Note: This is a description of the paper and is not the actual abstract.

JEL Classification: K22, G33, G34

Suggested Citation

Roosevelt, Kermit, Understanding Lockups: Effects in Bankruptcy and the Market for Corporate Control. Yale Journal on Regulation, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=164789

Kermit Roosevelt (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215.746.8775 (Phone)

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