The Problem of Pluralist Authority

30 Pages Posted: 29 Jul 2010 Last revised: 30 Jul 2010

See all articles by Victor M. Muniz-Fraticelli

Victor M. Muniz-Fraticelli

McGill University, Faculty of Law; McGill University, Department of Political Science

Date Written: July 28, 2010

Abstract

Can pluralism offer a coherent account of political authority, one that does not deny the (plural) authority of associations in the process of denying the (unitary) authority of the state? Most of the arguments that political pluralists have used to undermine the claims of the modern state to absolute and indivisible authority leave no room for the exercise of authority by associations themselves. In this article I will reconstruct one prominent pluralist critique of state authority and explain how it undermines the very basis of the authority of associations. I then propose an alternative account of the concept of authority derived from Joseph Raz’s explanation of the authority of law. This account allows for the recognition of legitimate authority in associations, but it also necessitates the recognition of two types of authority in the state. Thus, while vindicating the authority of associations, I hope to repudiate the anti-authoritarian and antinomian stance of much of political pluralist theory, and set it on sounder footing.

Keywords: pluralism, authority, associations, state, Laski, Raz

Suggested Citation

Muniz-Fraticelli, Victor M., The Problem of Pluralist Authority (July 28, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1650344 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1650344

Victor M. Muniz-Fraticelli (Contact Author)

McGill University, Faculty of Law

3644 Peel Street
Montreal, Quebec H3A 1W9
Canada

McGill University, Department of Political Science ( email )

Room 414, Leacock Building
855 Sherbrooke Street West
Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T7
Canada

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
171
Abstract Views
950
Rank
315,980
PlumX Metrics