Coercion, Taxation, and Voluntary Association

28 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2010 Last revised: 6 May 2011

See all articles by Roger D. Congleton

Roger D. Congleton

West Virginia University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Center for Study of Public Choice

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 4, 2011

Abstract

Voluntary and coercive relationships among person play important roles in ethics, political theory, and Western law. This essay attempts to clarify the meaning and limits of coercion using matrix representations of voluntary and coercive proposals.

Two settings are focused on in this paper: the first is one in which an outsider can make explicit or implicit proposals that an individual (or organization) can accept or reject. The second is one where governments make explicit or implicit proposals that an individual or organization can accept or reject by emigrating to another polity.

In both settings the "base line" turns out to be important in assessing whether a proposal is voluntarily accepted or "forced" upon the person or organization of interest.

Keywords: Coercion, Rent Extraction, Taxation, Tax Competition, Voluntary Association

JEL Classification: D60, H3, H73

Suggested Citation

Congleton, Roger D., Coercion, Taxation, and Voluntary Association (May 4, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1660473 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1660473

Roger D. Congleton (Contact Author)

West Virginia University - Department of Economics ( email )

PO Box 6025
Morgantown, WV 26506
United States

HOME PAGE: http://rdc1.net

George Mason University - Center for Study of Public Choice ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://rdc1.net

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