A Tale of Two Platforms: Dealer Intermediation in the European Sovereign Bond Market

53 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2010

See all articles by Peter G. Dunne

Peter G. Dunne

Central Bank of Ireland

Harald Hau

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI); Swiss Finance Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Michael Moore

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 13, 2010

Abstract

European sovereign bond trading occurs in a highly liquid inter-dealer market and a parallel dealer-customer market in which buy-side financial institutions request quotes from primary dealers. Synchronized price data from both market segments allow us to compare market quality. We find that customer transactions (i) are on average priced very favorably relative to the best inter-dealer quotes, (ii) feature a relatively high price dispersion at any given moment, and (iii) show less average quality deterioration under higher market volatility and bond maturity than the best inter-dealer quotes. We develop a simple dynamic model of dealer intermediation across markets that can account for these findings. The dealers’ inventory management concerns are shown to be an important determinant of customer transaction quality both in the model and in the data.

Keywords: Dealer Intermediation, Spread Determination, Adverse Selection, Market Segmentation

Suggested Citation

Dunne, Peter G. and Hau, Harald and Moore, Michael John, A Tale of Two Platforms: Dealer Intermediation in the European Sovereign Bond Market (August 13, 2010). INSEAD Working Paper No. 2010/64/FIN, WBS Finance Group Research Paper No. 145, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1668589 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1668589

Peter G. Dunne (Contact Author)

Central Bank of Ireland ( email )

P.O. Box 559
Dame Street
Dublin, 2
Ireland

Harald Hau

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI) ( email )

40 Boulevard du Pont d'Arve
Geneva 4, Geneva 1211
Switzerland

Swiss Finance Institute

Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Michael John Moore

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

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