Sending Signals: How Self-Interested Individuals Help Policymakers

Abstract

Policymakers operate with specifics, but the public sends signals at a level of generality. Policymakers need to read and anticipate that signal, basically that the public wants government to do more or less, and translate it into specific policies. This paper develops the Integrated Theory of Self-Interest, which provides a theoretical framework for understanding the effects of self-interest within the dynamic political context, and examines hypotheses about how the policy attitudes of self-interested individuals might contribute to macro-level politics. If self-interest has the individual level effects predicted by the Integrated Theory, then self-interested individuals will have rational opinions on specific policies that emerge as a clear signal to policymakers. To address this objective, I test for a conditional effect of self-interest on partisanship in terms of individuals’ issue attention, behavior, and electoral decisions based on relevant issue preferences when compared to individuals without an interest in a policy. The findings indicate that self-interested partisans are more likely to attend to issue information, engage in political behaviors designed to influence the issue, and express voting intentions consistent with their interests in the issue.