The Compellence Dilemma: International Disputes with Violent Groups

36 Pages Posted: 1 Sep 2010

See all articles by David Carter

David Carter

Pennsylvania State University

Date Written: August 31, 2010

Abstract

It is widely recognized that the security of states are strongly influenced by the internal policies of other states. Although states threatened by the internal policies of an adversary often consider the use of coercive instruments to compel a change to the policy, I argue that a dilemma arises in the use of harsh punishments that renders them unattractive and incredible. I analyze this compellence dilemma in the situation where a state is targeted by a violent non-state group that is hosted by a second state. Thus, the security of the state targeted by the group is threatened by the host state's provision of an international base for the group. I argue that although harsher punishments make cooperation with the target state against the group more attractive for the host, they are also destabilizing and make the host a less capable agent in the future. I analyze the compellence dilemma with a three-player infinitely repeated dynamic game in which the actors play stationary Markov strategies. I find that the existence of the compellence dilemma is pervasive in equilibrium and often prevents the target from utilizing a harsh punishment even when such a punishment would compel the host to cooperate. Concerns about future capacity and group power drive this result.

Keywords: Compellence, Non-State Actor, Terrorism, Insurgency, Transnational Group

JEL Classification: C73

Suggested Citation

Carter, David, The Compellence Dilemma: International Disputes with Violent Groups (August 31, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1669396 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1669396

David Carter (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park
State College, PA 16802
United States

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