Externalities from Labor Mobility

29 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2010 Last revised: 2 Sep 2022

See all articles by Laurence Ball

Laurence Ball

Johns Hopkins University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Date Written: May 1991

Abstract

This paper assumes that workers can move from a market with high unemployment to one with low unemployment at a cost. In principle. equilibrium mobility can be greater or less than the social optimum. For most plausible parameter values. however. mobility is too low. Intuitively. mobility has a beneficial externality: it helps workers remaining in the high-unemployment market by reducing competition for jobs. Mobility hurts workers in the market that movers join, but this effect is usually smaller.

Suggested Citation

Ball, Laurence M., Externalities from Labor Mobility (May 1991). NBER Working Paper No. w3720, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1674285

Laurence M. Ball (Contact Author)

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