Physicians' Fears of Malpractice Lawsuits are Not Assuaged by Tort Reforms

Posted: 11 Sep 2010

See all articles by Emily R. Carrier

Emily R. Carrier

Center for Studying Health System Change

James Reschovsky

Center for Studying Health System Change

Michelle M. Mello

Stanford Law School; Department of Medicine

Ralph Mayrell

Independent

David Katz

University of Iowa

Date Written: September 1, 2010

Abstract

Physicians lobby for malpractice reform on the basis that it will reduce defensive medical practice. This paper reports the results of a nationally representative survey of physicians concerning their fear of malpractice litigation. We compared physicians' perceptions of malpractice risk in states with different levels of more objective measures of risk, including malpractice premiums and state tort reforms. We found high levels of malpractice concern even in states where risk, measured by the more objective indicators, was low. Differences in levels of physician concern across states with and without common tort reforms were modest. We conclude that tort reforms may have a limited effect on physicians' malpractice fear and, thus, on defensive medicine. Physicians' fear levels may be out of step with their actual risk, reflecting the well-known human tendency to overestimate the likelihood of "dread risks". A PDF of the article can be obtained from Dr. Carrier.

Keywords: malpractice, liability, medical, tort reform

JEL Classification: I1, K13

Suggested Citation

Carrier, Emily R. and Reschovsky, James and Mello, Michelle M. and Mayrell, Ralph and Katz, David, Physicians' Fears of Malpractice Lawsuits are Not Assuaged by Tort Reforms (September 1, 2010). Health Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 9, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1674912

Emily R. Carrier (Contact Author)

Center for Studying Health System Change ( email )

600 Maryland Ave., SW
Suite 550
Washington, DC 20024-2512
United States

James Reschovsky

Center for Studying Health System Change ( email )

600 Maryland Ave. SW Ste. 550
Washington, DC 20024
United States

Michelle M. Mello

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
650-725-3894 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://law.stanford.edu/directory/michelle-m-mello/

Department of Medicine ( email )

Center for Health Policy / PCOR
Encina Commons
Stanford, CA 94305
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://profiles.stanford.edu/michelle-mello?tab=bio

Ralph Mayrell

Independent ( email )

David Katz

University of Iowa ( email )

341 Schaeffer Hall
Iowa City, IA 52242-1097
United States

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