Signaling and Screening for Recruitment among the Maoists in India

Abstract

Recruitment into underground criminal and terrorist organizations is rendered difficult by the absence of formal institutions to protect agreements of non‐defection by entrants. Threats of violence, and punishments by informal norms are also difficult when defectors can vanish into anonymity in a large population. Ex ante means of Spencian costly signaling allows prospective entrants to build trust to enter rebel organizations like the Maoists in India. Based on field interviews in jungles and tribal villages in south India, it is discovered that costly to mimic signals play an important role in the recruitment of Maoists. It is also discovered that “bridge‐burning”, i.e., behavior that reduces alternative options of livelihood, and behavior that increases asset specificity of candidates, increases trustworthiness of prospective entrants.

Keywords: Signaling, Social Norms, Trust, Extralegal Organizations, Civil Wars, Rebel Groups

JEL Classification: D82, C7