On the Optimal Number of Courts

33 Pages Posted: 8 Oct 2010

See all articles by Stefan Voigt

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: October 7, 2010

Abstract

This is the first paper to investigate whether the number of high courts in a country has systematic effects both on the quality of its legal system and on its level of economic development more generally. It is theorized that due to the division of labor and a higher degree of specialization, high courts might be advantageous in terms of court productivity. Yet, they might also be disadvantageous in terms of a less coherent legal system. It is empirically tested whether the positive or the negative effects prevail. Results show that a larger number of high courts never has any positive effect; indeed, with regard to some dependent variables, a greater number of high courts is correlated with worse outcomes.

Keywords: Organization of Courts, Specialized Courts, Constitutional vs. Supreme Courts, Independence of Courts vs. Constitutional Review, Legal Origins, Consistency of Judicial Decision-Making, Court Capture, Judges’ Productivity

JEL Classification: H11, K40, O17, P48

Suggested Citation

Voigt, Stefan, On the Optimal Number of Courts (October 7, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1689003 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1689003

Stefan Voigt (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49-40-428385782 (Phone)
+49-40-428386794 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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