Inflation and the Fiscal Limit

32 Pages Posted: 1 Nov 2010 Last revised: 27 Jan 2023

See all articles by Troy Davig

Troy Davig

Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

Eric M. Leeper

University of Virginia ; Indiana University at Bloomington - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Todd B. Walker

Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 2010

Abstract

We use a rational expectations framework to assess the implications of rising debt in an environment with a "fiscal limit." The fiscal limit is defined as the point where the government no longer has the ability to finance higher debt levels by increasing taxes, so either an adjustment to fiscal spending or monetary policy must occur to stabilize debt. We give households a joint probability distribution over the various policy adjustments that may occur, as well as over the timing of when the fiscal limit is hit. One policy option that stabilizes debt is a passive monetary policy, which generates a burst of inflation that devalues the existing nominal debt stock. The probability of this outcome places upward pressure on inflation expectations and poses a substantial challenge to a central bank pursuing an inflation target. The distribution of outcomes for the path of future inflation has a fat right tail, revealing that only a small set of outcomes imply dire inflationary scenarios. Avoiding these scenarios, however, requires the fiscal authority to renege on some share of future promised transfers.

Suggested Citation

Davig, Troy and Leeper, Eric Michael and Walker, Todd B., Inflation and the Fiscal Limit (October 2010). NBER Working Paper No. w16495, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1699572

Troy Davig (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City ( email )

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Eric Michael Leeper

University of Virginia ( email )

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Indiana University at Bloomington - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

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Todd B. Walker

Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics ( email )

Wylie Hall
Bloomington, IN 47405-6620
United States

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