Voter Rationality and Democratic Government

Critical Review, Vol. 20, pp. 313-226, 2008

Posted: 18 Nov 2010 Last revised: 21 Nov 2010

See all articles by D. Roderick Kiewiet

D. Roderick Kiewiet

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Andrea Mattozzi

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2008

Abstract

From a 1996 survey comparing the views of economists and ordinary voters, Bryan Caplan deduces several biases - anti-market, anti-foreign, pessimistic, and makework biases - to support his thesis that voters are rationally irrational, i.e., that, aware of the inconsequentiality of their votes, they rationally indulge their "preferences" for public policies that have harmful results. Yet if the standard of comparison is the public’s opposition to harmful policies, rather than the level of its opposition relative to that of economists, the “biases” disappear. In absolute terms, voters support free trade and are against protectionism, such that free-trade agreements are more prevalent among democratic, rather than autocratic, regimes. Finally, the protectionist policies that are adopted in this country are the product of interest-group politics, not of voters’ wrongheaded policy preferences.

Keywords: Public opinion, Trade policy

Suggested Citation

Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Mattozzi, Andrea, Voter Rationality and Democratic Government (2008). Critical Review, Vol. 20, pp. 313-226, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1710763

D. Roderick Kiewiet (Contact Author)

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
626 395-4032 (Phone)

Andrea Mattozzi

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Bologna
Italy

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