Improving Antibiotic Markets for Long Term Sustainability

71 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2010 Last revised: 16 Apr 2013

See all articles by Aaron S. Kesselheim

Aaron S. Kesselheim

Brigham and Women's Hospital/Harvard Medical School

Kevin Outterson

Boston University School of Law

Date Written: November 29, 2010

Abstract

The world faces a worsening public health crisis: A growing number of bacteria are resistant to available antibiotics. Yet there are few new antibiotics in the development pipeline to take the place of these increasingly ineffective drugs. We review a number of proposals intended to bolster drug development, including such financial incentives for pharmaceutical manufacturers as extending the effective patent life for new antibiotics. However, such strategies directly conflict with the clear need to reduce unnecessary antibiotic prescriptions and could actually increase prescription use. As an alternative, we recommend a two-prong, “integrated” strategy based on prizes administered through the insurance reimbursement system, but conditioned on the companies meeting conservation targets.

Keywords: antibiotic, resistance, intellectual property, patent, conservation, prize

JEL Classification: H41, H51, I18, K11, K19, K32, K33

Suggested Citation

Kesselheim, Aaron S. and Outterson, Kevin, Improving Antibiotic Markets for Long Term Sustainability (November 29, 2010). Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law & Ethics, Vol. 11, Winter 2011, Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper (Law & Economics) No. 10-42, Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper (Public Law & Legal Theory) No. 10-42, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1716942

Aaron S. Kesselheim (Contact Author)

Brigham and Women's Hospital/Harvard Medical School ( email )

1620 Tremont St
Suite 3030
Boston, MA 02120
United States
617-278-0930 (Phone)
617-232-8602 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.PORTALresearch.org

Kevin Outterson

Boston University School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

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