The National Regulatory Structure Against the Background of the European Regulatory System

48 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2010

See all articles by Tobias Veith

Tobias Veith

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Date Written: December 1, 2010

Abstract

States and their representatives, national governments, play a key role in national telecommunication markets. As lawmakers, they determine the playing field of the agents in the markets and the decision powers of national regulators. Simultaneously, they are involved in appointing presidential chambers of national regulators. On the other hand, governments keep shares in regulated companies and support single infrastructure projects based on financial and legal state aid measures.

Therefore, European Union regulatory frameworks require a strict separation of tasks between national ministries. However, the European Commission has repeatedly criticized member states for in-transparency and insufficient separations of tasks in national implementation.

While the Second Regulatory Package balanced competition and investment aims, the new Regulatory Package implemented in December 2009 dedicates a higher weight to the role of infrastructure quality as a driver of service innovations. Moreover, national regulators become more independent, and former national regulation tasks are partially shifted to the pan-European level. In consequence, the role of governments also changes.

I discuss the transposition process of Regulatory Packages to national laws and how they have been implemented on the national level to learn more about how the new Regulatory Package will affect the national situation and the European integration process.

Keywords: Telecommunication Infrastructure, Local Loop Competition, Regulatory Independence

JEL Classification: K23, L13, L43, L96

Suggested Citation

Veith, Tobias, The National Regulatory Structure Against the Background of the European Regulatory System (December 1, 2010). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 10-089, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1727452 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1727452

Tobias Veith (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
65
Abstract Views
1,144
Rank
622,699
PlumX Metrics