Ex Ante and Ex Post Merger Control: How to Enhance the Efficiency of Competition Policy?

Revue d'économie industrielle, Vol. 121, 2008

32 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2010 Last revised: 23 May 2012

See all articles by Patrice Bougette

Patrice Bougette

Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG

Florent Venayre

University of Angers - Laboratoire d'économie théorique et appliquée (LAMETA)

Date Written: May 1, 2007

Abstract

A recent French merger case involving two large water companies seems to toll the death of ex-post merger control. This paper aims at highlighting the interest of that type of control by showing its crucial role for competition authorities as a complement of the current notification system. Stressing the limits of an exclusively ex-ante control, we show that the possibility to act ex-post on market structures would lead to more virtuous behaviors in the ex-ante control by reducing adverse selection effects. The ex-post merger control would also permit new means of action on agents’ behaviors after the merger. Despite those positive effects, the implementation of an ex-post merger control should be attentively carried out in particular because some legal security problems could emerge. However, those issues might be offset by increasing the competence of the French competition authority in merger cases.

Note: Downloadable document is in French.

Keywords: Mergers, Ex-ante merger control, Ex-post merger control, Competition policy

JEL Classification: L42

Suggested Citation

Bougette, Patrice and Venayre, Florent, Ex Ante and Ex Post Merger Control: How to Enhance the Efficiency of Competition Policy? (May 1, 2007). Revue d'économie industrielle, Vol. 121, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1728476

Patrice Bougette (Contact Author)

Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG ( email )

GREDEG CNRS
250, rue Albert Einstein
Valbonne, 06560
France

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/patricebougette/Home

Florent Venayre

University of Angers - Laboratoire d'économie théorique et appliquée (LAMETA) ( email )

France

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