How Institutions and Business Strategies Affect Wages: A Cross National Study of Call Centers

Posted: 21 Dec 2010

See all articles by Rosemary Batt

Rosemary Batt

Cornell University - School of Industrial and Labor Relations

Hiroatsu Nohara

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

This paper, drawing on a 2003–2006 establishment-level survey of 1,819 call centers in 15 countries, examines effects of industrial relations institutions and employer strategies on wage variation across coordinated, liberal, and emerging market economies. The authors find several contradictory patterns, which confirm theoretical predictions for some countries and contradict them for others, suggesting diverse institutional reactions to the emergence of a new economic activity. Consistent with prior research, Denmark, France, and Sweden exhibit patterns of low wage dispersion and no union wage premium, and the United States, Canada, and emerging market economies exhibit quite high levels of dispersion. Contrary to prior research, Austria and Germany resemble the United States in their levels of wage dispersion, while the United Kingdom resembles the coordinated market group. Finally, employer strategies of outsourcing and market segmentation explain within-country wage variation in most countries, suggesting considerable flexibility in wage setting at the establishment level.

Keywords: globalization of services, strategic HRM, outsourcing, call centers, collective representation

JEL Classification: J2, J50

Suggested Citation

Batt, Rosemary and Nohara, Hiroatsu, How Institutions and Business Strategies Affect Wages: A Cross National Study of Call Centers (2009). Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 62, No. 4, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1728951

Rosemary Batt (Contact Author)

Cornell University - School of Industrial and Labor Relations ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
United States
607-254-4437 (Phone)
607-255-1836 (Fax)

Hiroatsu Nohara

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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