The Enminded Body. Spinoza, Descartes and the Philosophy of Cognitive Sciences - A Critical Note on a Major Ontological Issue
15 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2010
Date Written: December 23, 2010
Abstract
Ontologically, Spinoza must be wrong and Descartes must be right about mind and meaning. Nevertheless, Spinoza’s mysticism and resounding Spinozist rejections of Cartesian rationalism can be found in most basic assumptions of current cognitive science. The main issue of this ’metaphysical’ debate is the status of mind, of mental representations, meaning, and therefore the possibility of a cognitive linguistics, semantics, and semiotics.
Keywords: cognition, dualism, monism, ontology, representation, Descartes, Spinoza
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Brandt, Per Aage, The Enminded Body. Spinoza, Descartes and the Philosophy of Cognitive Sciences - A Critical Note on a Major Ontological Issue (December 23, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1730023 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1730023
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