Local Electoral Incentives and Decentralized Program Performance
39 Pages Posted: 27 Dec 2010 Last revised: 16 Apr 2023
There are 2 versions of this paper
Local Electoral Incentives and Decentralized Program Performance
Abstract
This paper analyzes how electoral incentives affected the performance of a major decentralized conditional cash transfer program intended on reducing school dropout rates among children of poor households in Brazil. We show that while this federal program successfully reduced school dropout by 8 percentage points, the program's impact was 36 percent larger in municipalities governed by mayors who faced reelection possibilities compared to those with lame-duck mayors. First term mayors with good program performance were much more likely to get re-elected. These mayors adopted program implementation practices that were not only more transparent but also associated with better program outcomes.
Keywords: conditional cash transfer, electoral incentives, decentralization, impact evaluation
JEL Classification: D78, H43, I28, O15
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Government Transfers and Political Support
By Marco Manacorda, Edward Miguel, ...
-
Government Transfers and Political Support
By Marco Manacorda, Edward Miguel, ...
-
Does Partisan Alignment Affect the Electoral Reward of Intergovernmental Transfers?
-
Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil
By Fernanda Brollo and Tommaso Nannicini
-
Can Regional Transfers Buy Public Support? Evidence from EU Structural Policy
-
The Effects of Unemployment Benefits on Migration in Lagging Regions
-
By Jonathan Polk, Johannes Karreth, ...