Auditor’s Independence and Quasi-Rents (La Independencia del Auditor y las Cuasi-Rentas) (Spanish)

Revista de Derecho Bancario y Bursátil, Vol. 79, pp. 175-193, 2000

10 Pages Posted: 15 Jan 2011

Date Written: 2000

Abstract

The economic structure of the relationship between the auditors and the audited firm explains the powerful incentives for auditor's independence. Auditors risk a lot in case lack of independence is found, not only their reputation may be tarnished, but also the investments (quasi-rents) in their relationship with the clients may be destroyed in case - for any reason - they are fired.

Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish.

Keywords: Auditor, Independence. Quasi-rents

Suggested Citation

Marcos, Francisco, Auditor’s Independence and Quasi-Rents (La Independencia del Auditor y las Cuasi-Rentas) (Spanish) (2000). Revista de Derecho Bancario y Bursátil, Vol. 79, pp. 175-193, 2000, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1737074

Francisco Marcos (Contact Author)

IE Law School ( email )

Castellón de la Plana 8
Madrid, Madrid 28006
Spain

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