Auditor’s Independence and Quasi-Rents (La Independencia del Auditor y las Cuasi-Rentas) (Spanish)
Revista de Derecho Bancario y Bursátil, Vol. 79, pp. 175-193, 2000
10 Pages Posted: 15 Jan 2011
Date Written: 2000
Abstract
The economic structure of the relationship between the auditors and the audited firm explains the powerful incentives for auditor's independence. Auditors risk a lot in case lack of independence is found, not only their reputation may be tarnished, but also the investments (quasi-rents) in their relationship with the clients may be destroyed in case - for any reason - they are fired.
Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish.
Keywords: Auditor, Independence. Quasi-rents
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Marcos, Francisco, Auditor’s Independence and Quasi-Rents (La Independencia del Auditor y las Cuasi-Rentas) (Spanish) (2000). Revista de Derecho Bancario y Bursátil, Vol. 79, pp. 175-193, 2000, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1737074
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