Oligopoly and Trade

42 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2011

See all articles by Dermot Leahy

Dermot Leahy

National University of Ireland - University College Dublin; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

J. Peter Neary

University of Oxford - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: December 2010

Abstract

In this chapter we present a selective analytic survey of some of the main results of trade under oligopoly. We concentrate on three topics: oligopoly as an independent determinant of trade, as illustrated by the reciprocal-markets model of Brander (1981); oligopoly as an independent rationale for government intervention, as illustrated by strategic trade and industrial policy in the third-market model of Spencer and Brander (1983); and the challenges and potential of embedding trade under oligopoly in general equilibrium as illustrated by the GOLE model of Neary (2002).

Keywords: GOLE (General Oligopolistic Equilibrium), reciprocal dumping, strategic trade policy

JEL Classification: F12, L13

Suggested Citation

Leahy, Dermot and Neary, J. Peter, Oligopoly and Trade (December 2010). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8172, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1742697

Dermot Leahy (Contact Author)

National University of Ireland - University College Dublin ( email )

Department of Economics
Belfield
Dublin 4
Ireland
+353 1 706 7620 (Phone)
+353 1 283 0068 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

J. Peter Neary

University of Oxford - Department of Economics ( email )

Manor Road Building
Manor Road
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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