Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries: An Empirical Analysis

The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2009

Posted: 23 Jan 2011

See all articles by Laura Recuero Virto

Laura Recuero Virto

OECD Development Center

Farid Gasmi

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Paul Noumba

World Bank

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 20, 2009

Abstract

The relationship between the quality of political institutions and the performance of regulation has recently assumed greater prominence in the policy debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure industry reforms. Taking the view that political accountability is a key factor linking political and regulatory structures and processes, this article empirically investigates its impact on the performance of regulation in telecommunications in time-series–cross-sectional data sets for 29 developing countries and 23 developed countries during 1985–99. In addition to confirming some well-documented results on the positive role of regulatory governance in infrastructure industries, the article provides empirical evidence on the impact of the quality of political institutions and their modes of functioning on regulatory performance. The analysis finds that the impact of political accountability on the performance of regulation is stronger in developing countries. An important policy implication is that future reforms in these countries should give due attention to the development of politically accountable systems.

Keywords: Political accountability, infrastructure

JEL Classification: L51, H11, L96, L97, C23

Suggested Citation

Recuero Virto, Laura and Gasmi, Farid and Noumba, Paul, Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries: An Empirical Analysis (January 20, 2009). The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1744078

Laura Recuero Virto (Contact Author)

OECD Development Center ( email )

Paris

Farid Gasmi

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

Paul Noumba

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-0151 (Phone)
202-676-9874 (Fax)

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