The Enron Pension Jigsaw: Assembling Accountable Corporate Governance by Fiduciaries

University of British Columbia Law Review, Vol. 36, pp. 541-574, 2003

34 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2011

See all articles by Ronald B. Davis

Ronald B. Davis

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Faculty of Law

Date Written: 2003

Abstract

This article explores the extent to which the potential and actual conflicts of interest that pervade pension fund administration and investment have influenced the corporate governance activities of these funds. The exploration of these issues is situated in the context of the events surrounding the collapse of Enron and the devastating effects of that collapse on the pension rights of Enron's employees. The ability of conflicts of interest to influence outcomes in respect of corporate governance activity, as well as the degree of imprudence exhibited in the permitted investment choices of certain retirement plans, raises concerns about the efficiency of fiduciary duty as a means to control these conflicts.

Keywords: Pension funds, corporate governance, conflict of interest

Suggested Citation

Davis, Ronald B., The Enron Pension Jigsaw: Assembling Accountable Corporate Governance by Fiduciaries (2003). University of British Columbia Law Review, Vol. 36, pp. 541-574, 2003 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1749790

Ronald B. Davis (Contact Author)

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Faculty of Law ( email )

1822 East Mall
Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z1
Canada

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