Comparing Consequences of Carrots and Sticks on Cooperation in Repeated Public Good Games

19 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2011 Last revised: 10 Aug 2011

See all articles by Vera Wiedemann

Vera Wiedemann

Wageningen University and Research (WUR) - Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI)

Davide Barrera

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Vincent Buskens

Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR); Utrecht University - Department of Sociology/ICS

Date Written: January 28, 2011

Abstract

Many sociologists and economists have maintained that costly sanctions indeed are able to create and sustain cooperation, but under which conditions carrots or sticks are more successful in this respect still an unsettled issue. Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest (2009) recently clarify that the multiplication effect related to sticks is a plausible theoretical explanation for the superiority of sticks. However, there are also more behavioral arguments from which one could maintain that carrots might work better than sticks, for example, because they do not undermine the cohesion of the group as sticks might do. This experimental study investigates whether in a simple experimental setting sticks and carrots differ in their effectiveness in maintaining cooperation. Our results show that while carrots do increase cooperation, sticks turn out to be more effective in our experiment. In addition, we do not find that the group cohesion becomes stronger in the condition with carrots although giving rewards produces positive feelings towards the group.

Keywords: Public Good Game, cooperation, sanctions, experiments

JEL Classification: C92

Suggested Citation

Wiedemann, Vera and Barrera, Davide and Buskens, Vincent and Buskens, Vincent, Comparing Consequences of Carrots and Sticks on Cooperation in Repeated Public Good Games (January 28, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1750186 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1750186

Vera Wiedemann

Wageningen University and Research (WUR) - Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) ( email )

Burgemeester Patijnlaan 19
The Hague, 2502 LS
Netherlands

Davide Barrera

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Vincent Buskens (Contact Author)

Utrecht University - Department of Sociology/ICS ( email )

Heidelberglaan 2
Utrecht, 3584 CS
Netherlands

Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) ( email )

Rotterdam
Netherlands

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