Download This PaperBeyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records
30 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2011
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Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records
Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records
Date Written: January 31, 2011
Abstract
The difficulty of optimal decision making in uncertain dichotomous choice settings is that it requires information on the expertise of the decision makers (voters). This paper presents a method of optimally weighting voters even without testing them against questions with known right answers. The method is based on the realization that if we can see how voters vote on a variety of questions, it is possible to gauge their respective degrees of expertise by comparing their votes in a suitable fashion, even without knowing the right answers.
JEL Classification: D70
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Shmuel Nitzan (Contact Author)
Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )
Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+972.3.531.8930 (Phone)
+972.3.535.3180 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
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