EU Antitrust Enforcement Powers and Procedural Rights and Guarantees: The Interplay Between EU Law, National Law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European Convention on Human Rights

World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol. 34, No. 2, June 2011

Concurrences, May 2011

2nd Annual International Concurrences Conference, 'New Frontiers of Antitrust', Paris, February 11, 2011

32 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2011

See all articles by Wouter P. J. Wils

Wouter P. J. Wils

King's College London - The Dickson Poon School of Law; European Union - European Commission

Date Written: January 24, 2011

Abstract

This paper deals with the powers of the European Commission and the competition authorities of the EU Member States to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and with the procedural rights and guarantees that circumscribe or limit these powers. It focuses in particular on the interplay between the different sources of law governing these matters: EU and national legislation, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the case-law of the EU Courts and the European Court of Human Rights.

Keywords: antitrust, public enforcement, powers of investigation, procedure, fundamental rights, EU, ECHR

JEL Classification: K20, K21, K40, K42, L40

Suggested Citation

Wils, Wouter P. J., EU Antitrust Enforcement Powers and Procedural Rights and Guarantees: The Interplay Between EU Law, National Law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European Convention on Human Rights (January 24, 2011). World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol. 34, No. 2, June 2011, Concurrences, May 2011, 2nd Annual International Concurrences Conference, 'New Frontiers of Antitrust', Paris, February 11, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1759209 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1759209

Wouter P. J. Wils (Contact Author)

King's College London - The Dickson Poon School of Law

Somerset House East Wing
Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

European Union - European Commission ( email )

Brussels, B-1049
Belgium

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