Determinants of Voluntary CSR Disclosure: Empirical Evidence from Germany

Review of Managerial Science, Vol. 4, 2011

Posted: 13 Feb 2011

See all articles by Ramin Gamerschlag

Ramin Gamerschlag

University of Goettingen (Göttingen)

Klaus Moeller

University of St. Gallen

Frank Verbeeten

Utrecht University - School of Economics

Date Written: October 5, 2010

Abstract

Currently, companies spend a great deal of effort on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosures. CSR disclosure relates to the provision of information on companies’ environmental and social performance. From an economic perspective, companies might disclose this information to avoid or decrease potential political costs. We construct a CSR disclosure index based on the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines. Using content analysis, we analyze 130 listed German companies’ CSR disclosures (470 firm-year observations) to investigate the determinants of these voluntary disclosure activities. Our results show that, consistent with the political cost theory, German companies’ disclosures of all CSR issues are affected by their visibility, shareholder structure, and relationship with their US stakeholders. In addition, higher profitability is associated with more environmental disclosures. Finally, size and industry membership affect the amount of CSR disclosure.

Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Content Analysis, Global Reporting Initiative,Voluntary Disclosure

Suggested Citation

Gamerschlag, Ramin and Moeller, Klaus and Verbeeten, Frank H.M., Determinants of Voluntary CSR Disclosure: Empirical Evidence from Germany (October 5, 2010). Review of Managerial Science, Vol. 4, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1760790

Ramin Gamerschlag

University of Goettingen (Göttingen) ( email )

Platz der Gottinger Sieben 3
Gottingen, D-37073
Germany

Klaus Moeller (Contact Author)

University of St. Gallen ( email )

Chair for Controlling/Performance Management
Tigerbergstrasse 9
St. Gallen, 9000
Switzerland
+41 71 224 74 06 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.aca.unisg.ch

Frank H.M. Verbeeten

Utrecht University - School of Economics ( email )

Kriekenpitplein 21-22
Adam Smith Building
Utrecht, 3584 EC
Netherlands
+31 30 253 9800 (Phone)

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