Chinese Competition: Do We Need a New Competition Policy Regime?

ISS Working Paper No. 518

19 Pages Posted: 6 Mar 2011

See all articles by Peter A. G. van Bergeijk

Peter A. G. van Bergeijk

Erasmus University - Institute of Social Studies (ISS)

P.B. Gaasbeek

Independent

Date Written: February 22, 2011

Abstract

This paper discusses changes in the Chinese competition policy regime and analyses the key drivers of this process against the background of the Chinese choice for gradual and pragmatic structural reform.

In Section 1 we discuss the reasons behind the Chinese model and argue that these drivers will remain valid in the foreseeable future. In particular we believe that China’s national interest rather than a specific ideology will be the key determinant of its future actions. Section 2 then discusses the evolution and features of the Chinese competition policy and its instruments providing details both of developments since 1993 and the present (March 2011) status. We contrast these aspects with the characteristics of the competition policy framework(s) in Europe. In the final section we speculate about the potential impact of the new role and influence of China on (global) competition rules and enforcement and offer a recipe to meet the Chinese competition.

Keywords: antitrust, china, competition policy,global governance, development, structural reform

JEL Classification: K21, I40, N41, O29, P30, P52

Suggested Citation

van Bergeijk, Peter A.G. and Gaasbeek, P.B., Chinese Competition: Do We Need a New Competition Policy Regime? (February 22, 2011). ISS Working Paper No. 518 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1766482 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1766482

Peter A.G. Van Bergeijk (Contact Author)

Erasmus University - Institute of Social Studies (ISS) ( email )

PO Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague, 2518 AX
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.economie.blogspot.com

P.B. Gaasbeek

Independent ( email )

United States

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